Introduction
The past years have seen growing youth engagement in unconventional political activities (Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 2006) . Thus, the need to understand why young people prefer one kind of political activity over the others is becoming more apparent. Previous studies have shown that the ways in which adolescents process selfrelevant information (identity-processing styles) have the implications for their values and social and religious beliefs (Berzonsky, Cieciuch, Duriez, & Soenens, 2011; Duriez, Soenens, & Beyers, 2004) . So far, however, too little attention has been paid to the association between adolescents' identity styles and their perceptions of political activities. In order to fill this gap, the present paper examines whether adolescents' tendency to employ different identity styles relates to how they perceive the effectiveness of various political activities.
People can choose among various means how to express their political views and promote social change. Such means comprise (1) traditional activity, targeting established agencies such as political parties; (2) non-traditional activity, aiming at civic organizations; and (3) direct activity oriented towards specific causes and includes petitions or demonstrations (see Norris, 2003) . Deciding among these activities depends on whether the person perceives a given activity as an effective instrument for achieving the desired outcome because people usually do not participate politically if they doubt the effectiveness of such participation (Klandermans, 1997) .
The preference for particular forms of political activity is known to be associated with one's political beliefs. Traditionally, political trust and political efficacy are hypothesized to affect persons' willingness to act politically (Gamson, 1968) and their preference for either traditional or non-traditional means of participation (Bandura, 1997) .
Political efficacy consists of two interrelated beliefs: an assessment of personal capabilities and resources (internal efficacy), and an assessment of the openness of a social system to change (external efficacy). This paper focuses rather on the external aspect, which represents generalized belief that social changes are possible, and as such, positively relates to perceived effectiveness of a wide variety of political activities targeting these changes. On the other hand, political trust (a belief that political authorities observe the rules of the game and serve the public) relates to the preference for traditional activity while not for other activities (Bandura, 1997) .
Besides, political thinking and behavior have to be seen at the context of personal and social development of the individual (Mondak & Halperin, 2008) . These processes become salient especially in late adolescence, when political identity is being formed and young people express their identities and identity-related processes through their behavior, including political activities (Bynner, Romney, & Emler, 2003; Erikson, 1968) . Using a social-cognitive developmental perspective, Berzonsky (1989) identified three ways in which young people seek, process, and use identity-relevant information: (1) the informationoriented style, characterized by the search for, and evaluation of information before committing to certain decisions, (2) the normative style, with a predominant focus on the norms and expectations of significant others, and (3) the diffuse-avoidant style with a tendency to procrastinate when making decisions. We suppose that namely two active identity-processing styles (informational and normative) can influence the process of political thinking and participation of adolescents since people employing diffuse-avoidant style do not commit to specific planned actions and tend to drift from one decision to another.
We expect that young people employing informational style are more inclined than other people to non-traditional solutions to problems and appreciate creative and sophisticated political activities that go beyond traditional politics. It comes from the fact that they are able to cope with conflicting information, are more autonomous and complex in their thinking (Berzonsky & Ferrari, 1996) , have a higher need for cognition (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992) , and are more open to new experiences, ideas or actions (Dunkel, Papini, & Berzonsky, 2008; Duriez et al., 2004) . Moreover, their tendency to gather information and look for new solutions is associated with a perceived internal control over the events around them (Berzonsky, 1989) . Thus, we suppose that the informational style positively predicts the overall sense of political efficacy.
On the other hand, people high in the normative style are expected to decry the direct forms of political activity and incline to the traditional ones. These people are conformist, internalize the values and goals of others, and protect themselves from information that might interfere with their perceptions (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992) .
Previous research has also revealed their tendency to approve of right-wing authoritarian political ideology and conservative attitudes (Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Soenens, Duriez, & Goossens, 2005) , which are characterized by an adherence to conventional norms and an aversion to any form of social rebellion (Altemeyer, 1996) . In addition, the respect for social authorities, typical among normative-oriented young people, may translate into higher political trust, which strengthens their appreciation of the traditional activity.
In sum, our question is whether the employment of different identity styles relates to how a person perceives the effectiveness of traditional, non-traditional, and direct political activity. We expect that people employing an informational style will perceive non-traditional activity to be effective, while people employing a normative style will appreciate traditional and diminish direct activities. Next, we suppose that the informational style affects the development of political efficacy, and that the normative style affects the development of political trust, thus the effect of identity-processing styles will be mediated by these two political beliefs. (1) informational style (12 items, e.g. "When I have to make a decision, I like to spend a lot of time thinking about my options"; alphas .83 at T1, and .83 at T2); (2) normative style (seven items, e.g. "I find it is best for me to rely on the advice of close friends or relatives when I have a problem"; alphas .80 at T1, and .73 at T2). Latter subscale was formed from the original 12-item version by omitting five items, uncorrelated with total score. CFA showed that the present version was one-dimensional (standardized factor loadings from .32 Perceived effectiveness of political activities. Participants were asked: "If ordinary citizens want to influence decisions taken on social issues, they can choose from various activities. How meaningful do you think the following activities are in terms of influence on social issues?" Then they assessed seven activities on the four-point scale from "is always meaningful" to "never is." Traditional activity was represented by two items: voting, and political party membership (α = .61). Non-traditional activity was represented by two items:
Method
sending money to some organization dealing with the issue, and giving active help to some organization dealing with the issue (α = .72). Direct activity was represented by three items:
petition signing, taking part in demonstrations, and illegal action (e. g., occupation) (α = .68).
Confirmatory factor analysis proved the existence of three distinctive perceived forms of political activity. A model with three correlated latent factors exhibited a perfect fit (χ 
Strategy of analyses
In order to retain a reasonable ratio between free parameters and sample size, we estimated three separate path models with: perceived effectiveness of traditional, nontraditional, and direct activity. Full information maximum likelihood estimator (Mplus 6.1) was used to include the cases with partially missing data (covariance coverage from 82 to 100 %). All models contained T1 and T2 measurements of informational style, normative style, political efficacy, and political trust. Based on our assumptions, we allowed informational style to correlate with political efficacy, and normative style to correlate with political trust.
Also both political beliefs were allowed to intercorrelate. Further, we assumed two longitudinal effects: from informational style to political efficacy, and from normative style to political trust. All T2 variables were set to predict perceived effectiveness of traditional/nontraditional/direct activity, which was measured only at T2 (see Figure 1) .
Results
Three path models predicting perceptions of three forms of activity are depicted together in Figure 1 . All models had a perfect fit, suggesting that no relevant path was omitted. Correlation matrix of all scales can be found in Table 1 .
All variables measured at T1 were significantly associated in the expected way.
However, informational style did not predict a change in political efficacy, and normative style did not predict a change in political trust. The paths could be removed from the model without significant worsening of its fit (Δχ 2 2 = 2.69, p = .26). Thus, despite the association at T1 we found no longitudinal effect of identity styles on political beliefs. This result implicated that the effect of identity styles on perceived effectiveness could not be mediated by political beliefs.
Perceived effectiveness of different forms of political activity was predicted by different variables. Perceived effectiveness of traditional activity was predicted mainly by political trust, perceived effectiveness of non-traditional activity was predicted mainly by informational style, and perceived effectiveness of radical activity was predicted by adolescents' political efficacy and (negatively) by normative style.
Discussion
We found that there is an association between how young people perceive the effectiveness of various political activities and their identity-related cognitive strategies.
Information-oriented people are open to non-traditional ideas, actions, and values (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992) . Our data suggests that this openness is reflected in their political thinking as well. Specifically, the tendency to search for information in the process of self-definition (informational style) positively predicts greater appreciation of non-traditional political activity aiming at organizations focused on specific social issues. At the same time, the information-orientation does not translate into perceptions of direct activity and only slightly affects the evaluation of traditional activity. The tendency of young people to conform and to dismiss inconvenient information (normative style) has a weaker but still noticeable relation to their perception of political activities. It is not true that highly normative people appreciate traditional political activity more than the others as we hypothesized based on their preference of conservative beliefs (Berzonsky et al., 2011; Duriez & Soensen, 2006) .
Nevertheless, consistently with their conservative beliefs, they distrust the effectiveness of direct activity. The associations are present despite the two-year interval between the measurements, suggesting that some political perceptions do reflect more stable cognitive styles.
Originally, we argued that the tendency to search for information strengthens one's general belief that achievement of social change is possible (political efficacy), and that the normative style leads to higher political trust. Although these associations were moderately present at the age 17, no longitudinal effects were found. These findings suggest that the development of political efficacy and trust in late adolescence is driven by different factors than the identity-related cognitive styles (e.g., direct and indirect experiences with political world). The associations with cognate personality traits that are reported in the literature (Mondak & Halperin, 2008) may originate from the earlier political development.
Looking at our results from another perspective, young people's thinking about political activities is associated with both their political beliefs and more general cognitive styles. However, both factors have unequal relevancy for different activities. Traditional activity is perceived as effective by people who trust politicians, while personality characteristics play only a minor (informational style), or no (normative style) role here.
When considering the effectiveness of non-traditional activity, the tendency to look for information is the only substantial predictor while political trust does not matter. Direct activity is favored by people who believe in the possibility to achieve social change and who tend to be nonconformists. At the same time, the appreciation of direct activity does not stem from lower political trust, which supports recent findings that direct activity is not the domain of people frustrated by traditional politics (Norris, Walgrave, & Aelst, 2005) . Generally, it seems that perceived effectiveness of traditional activity reflects actual trust in the political system, while more general and stable personality characteristics matter within perceptions of less conventional activities.
Besides some limitations, our study extends current knowledge about the correlates of identity-related cognitive styles. Since it was conducted on participants with higher educational level, included a limited number of possible predictors, employed only one measure of perceived effectiveness, and had not completely longitudinal design (dependent variable was not measured at the age 17), further replications are needed. Based purely on the fact that people reported some degree of effectiveness for certain actions, we cannot infer whether they would engage in those activities in reality, because other factors come into play, such as resources and opportunities. On the other hand, most of our results are consistent with expectations deduced from the general characteristics of both identity styles. While previous studies have shown the implications for a person's values and social and religious beliefs, we have pointed out that the perception of political activities is associated with identity styles as well. At the same time, our research suggests that young people's perceptions in this area are not only based on their beliefs about the political system but also stem from more general ways of approaching the social world. 
